Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar Por
The protection of cyberspace, the information medium, has become a vital national interest because of its importance both to the economy and to military power. An attacker may tamper with networks to steal information for the money or to disrupt operations. Future wars are likely to be carried out, in part or perhaps entirely, in cyberspace. It might therefore seem obvious that maneuvering in cyberspace is like maneuvering in other media, but nothing would be more misleading. Cyberspace has its own laws; for instance, it is easy to hide identities and difficult to predict or even understand battle damage, and attacks deplete themselves quickly. Cyberwar is nothing so much as the manipulation of ambiguity. The author explores these topics in detail and uses the results to address such issues as the pros and cons of counterattack, the value of deterrence and vigilance, and other actions the United States and the U.S. Air Force can take to protect itself in the face of deliberate cyberattack.
Electricity Requirements for a Digital Society Por
Increasing use of the Internet and other information and communications technologies (ICTs) marks a U.S. transition toward a "digital society" that may profoundly affect electricity supply, demand and delivery. RAND developed four 20-year scenarios of ICT evolution (2001-2021) for the U.S. Department of Energy and assessed their implications for future U.S. electricity requirements. Increased power consumption by ICT equipment is the most direct and visible effect, but not necessarily the most important. Over time, the effects that ICTs have on energy management, e-commerce, telework, and related trends will likely be much more consequential. Even large growth in the deployment and use of digital technologies will only modestly increase U.S. electricity use over the next two decades. The more pressing concern for an emerging digital society will be how to provide the higher-quality and more-reliable power that ICTs demand.
Estimating the Global Cost of Cyber Risk: Methodology and Examples Por
There is marked variability from study to study in the estimated direct and systemic costs of cyber incidents, which is further complicated by the considerable variation in cyber risk in different countries and industry sectors. This report shares a transparent and adaptable methodology for estimating present and future global costs of cyber risk that acknowledges the considerable uncertainty in the frequencies and costs of cyber incidents. Specifically, this methodology (1) identifies the value at risk by country and industry sector; (2) computes direct costs by considering multiple financial exposures for each industry sector and the fraction of each exposure that is potentially at risk to cyber incidents; and (3) computes the systemic costs of cyber risk between industry sectors using Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development input, output, and value-added data across sectors in more than 60 countries. The report has a companion Excel-based modeling and simulation platform that allows users to alter assumptions and investigate a wide variety of research questions. The authors used a literature review and data to create multiple sample sets of parameters. They then ran a set of case studies to show the model's functionality and to compare the results against those in the existing literature. The resulting values are highly sensitive to input parameters; for instance, the global cost of cyber crime has direct gross domestic product (GDP) costs of $275 billion to $6.6 trillion and total GDP costs (direct plus systemic) of $799 billion to $22.5 trillion (1.1 to 32.4 percent of GDP).
The Global Technology Revolution 2020, Executive Summary: Bio/Nano/Materials/Information Trends, Drivers, Barriers, and Social Implications Por
In 2020, areas of particular importance for technology trends will include biotechnology, nanotechnology, materials technology, and information technology. The authors of this report assessed a sample of 29 countries across the spectrum of scientific advancement (low to high) with respect to their ability to acquire and implement 16 key technology applications (e.g., cheap solar energy, rural wireless communications, genetically modified crops). The study’s major conclusions are that scientifically advanced countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan will be able to implement all key technology applications evaluated; countries that are not scientifically advanced will have to develop significant capacity and motivation before barriers to technology implementation can be overcome; and public policy issues in certain areas will engender public debate and strongly influence technology implementation.
An Intelligence in Our Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in Artificial Intelligence Por
Machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence systems influence many aspects of people's lives: news articles, movies to watch, people to spend time with, access to credit, and even the investment of capital. Algorithms have been empowered to make such decisions and take actions for the sake of efficiency and speed. Despite these gains, there are concerns about the rapid automation of jobs (even such jobs as journalism and radiology). A better understanding of attitudes toward and interactions with algorithms is essential precisely because of the aura of objectivity and infallibility cultures tend to ascribe to them. This report illustrates some of the shortcomings of algorithmic decisionmaking, identifies key themes around the problem of algorithmic errors and bias, and examines some approaches for combating these problems. This report highlights the added risks and complexities inherent in the use of algorithmic decisionmaking in public policy. The report ends with a survey of approaches for combating these problems.
Scaffolding the New Web: Standards and Standards Policy for the Digital Economy Por
Although much of the growing digital economy rests on the Internet and World Wide Web, which in turn rest on information technology standards, it is unclear how much longer the current momentum can be sustained absent new standards. To discover whether today's standards processes are adequate, where they are taking the industry, and whether government intervention will be required to address systemic failures in their development, RAND undertook five case studies. So far, it seems, the current standards process remains basically healthy, with various consortia taking up the reins of the process, and the rise of open-source software has also aided vendor-neutral standardization. Nevertheless, the prospects for semantic standards to fulfill XML's promise are uncertain. Can the federal government help? Its policy on software patents clearly merits revisiting. More proactively, the National Institute for Standards and Technology could intensify its traditional functions: developing methodologies; broadening the technology base; and constructing, on neutral ground, terrain maps of the various electronic-commerce standards and standards contenders.
Toward an Ethics and Etiquette for Electronic Mail Por
This report discusses some important general attributes of electronic mail and message systems, and the effects of those attributes on the quality and appropriateness of communication. The authors discuss the “etiquette” of sending and receiving electronic mail, drawing on personal observation of inappropriate or counterproductive uses of these systems. By presenting some initial guidelines, the authors attempt to accelerate the process by which social customs and behavior appropriate to electronic mail become established, and thereby to accelerate the effective use of such systems.
What Should Be Classified? A Framework with Application to the Global Force Management Data Initiative Por
For its operational planning and budget programming, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs frequent access to current, detailed data on authorized force structures for all the services. Having users aggregate this information themselves was difficult, time consuming, and error prone. Hence, DoD launched the Global Force Management Data Initiative (GFM DI). While most of the data from the GFM DI are unclassified, the fact that it facilitates data aggregation raised concerns about what a potential adversary might be able to do with access to it and whether it would be better to classify such data and store it exclusively on the secure network. The authors address this question by looking at why material should or should not be classified, concluding that classification is warranted only (1) if it reduces the amount of information available to adversaries, (2) if the information kept from adversaries would tell them something they did not know, (3) if they could make better decisions based on this information, and (4) if such decisions would harm the United States. Using this framework, the authors balance the risks GFM DI poses against the costs to DoD of not having this information readily available to its own analysts. The authors conclude that overall classification is not necessary but suggest that some limited subsets may warrant additional protection.
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Comisión Estatal de Elecciones CEE-SA-2020-3538
Aprobado por la Comisión Estatal de Elecciones y el número de radicación correspondiente